This lecture addresses the practical dilemma of populist leaders winning support by promising swift and visible action in the name of 'the people' and against 'the elites', all the while sidelining expertise and compromise. Once in office, this often results in policies that are easy to announce but difficult to implement, thereby increasing volatility and straining institutions.

Join Professor Giliberto Capano as he explores whether robust policy design — policies that adapt to changing conditions without losing effectiveness — can offer a partial remedy. The challenge is political: populist leaders are rarely drawn to the language of sound design. Professor Capano, therefore, asks whether better design can be made compatible with populist incentives by framing it as practical protection against failure, reversals and public embarrassment.

A central idea is the role of 'persuaders' working behind the scenes who can incorporate safeguards into the details, such as eligibility rules, simplified delivery, feedback loops and built-in adjustments. The lecture does not assume that populism can be eliminated from democracy. Instead, it asks more cautiously under what conditions backstage efforts can reduce policy breakdown and help governments deliver measures that outlast the headline.

This lecture is presented as part of the Miegunyah Distinguished Visiting Fellowship Program made possible through the generous support of the Russell and Mab Grimwade Miegunyah Fund. Professor Capano is also visiting Melbourne as an ANZSOG Academic Fellow.

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