Winning mayoral incumbents: Election violence, term-limited performance, and the unfortunate legacy of district proliferation

What actions might mayoral incumbents undertake to enhance their chances of re-election and how well do they perform if they do gain an additional term in office? I study these questions for Indonesia during the country’s second round of direct local elections, which were rolled out starting in 2010. I argue that mayoral incumbents were more likely to use violence in the run-up to elections to win another term of office compared to other candidates and I present some supporting evidence. I find that, after taking their seats, second-term mayors spent considerably less on capital projects than first-term mayors. Both of these results are completely explained by winning incumbents from districts established during the implementation of the country’s early and haphazard policy of “district splitting” (pemekaran). In addition, I determine that second-term mayors in newly created districts reduced access to local public services, particularly in health and infrastructure. I conclude that the election of incumbent mayors led to a rise in electoral violence and had a negative impact on key local spending and service outcomes, especially in newly established districts.